“A Structural Model For Best Offer Sales on eBay” (Job Market Paper)

Abstract: “This paper studies the “Best Offer” selling mechanism on eBay using a structural model. In this mechanism, sellers set a `Buy it now’ price for the item, and also receive offers from buyers. The mechanism provides a bargaining environment for buyers and sellers. A two stage method to estimate buyers’ private valuations and their distribution is proposed. By counterfactual simulations I examine the optimal selling strategies and find that the sellers’ behavior in the market is consistent with revenue maximization”

“Structural Estimation of an Asymmetric Common Value Auction Model” (with Seda Bulbul Toklu and Robin Sickles), preliminary draft.

Abstract: “In this paper, we propose a structural estimation method for a common value auction model with asymmetrically informed bidders. Nonparametric identification and estimation methods are discussed. For the empirical analysis, we use a data set of federal auctions of drainage leases for oil and gas exploration rights on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). For any leased tract, firms that already own a neighbor tract have an informational advantage over other firms due to their previous drilling activity in the neighbor tract. We estimate the private information of informed firms and quantify the effect of the information asymmetry on the sale price.”

“An Incomplete Model for ‘Best Offer’ Sales on eBay”

Abstract: “This paper focuses on the “Best Offer” selling mechanism on eBay that has not
been studied much in the literature. The mechanism allows buyers to make offers to
sellers below the “Buy it now” price. I propose an incomplete model based on a weak
behavioral assumption to estimate the determinants of willingness-to-pay of buyers
who use the “Best Offer” format. Using a data set of used Ford Mustangs sold through
this mechanism, I estimate the model, and test whether different groups of buyers have
the same distribution of willingness-to-pay. Results suggest that sellers adopt a harder
bargaining strategy against buyers who o¤er more than once.”

“Estimation of a Model of Entry and Bidding on Wildcat Oil Leases”, preliminary draft.

Abstract: “This paper studies federal auctions for oil and gas exploration rights on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) from 1954 to 1970. I estimate the entry cost of bidding in wildcat oil leases whose geological and seismic characteristics are not well known by the bidders prior to bidding. Using that estimate and endogenizing the entry I then run counterfactual simulations to measure the effect of potential competition on winning bid.”